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Edward L. Korn
It is an honor to be a discussant to the Morris
Hansen Lecture, and a pleasure to be discussing Don
Rubin’s talk. Dr. Rubin has clarified over the years
many of the deep issues relating to causal inference.
Let me start with a story. About 20 years ago
when I was teaching at UCLA, I was eating break-
fast one morning at my kitchen table, and my two-
and-a-half-year-old daughter was in the next room,
lying on her back and kicking the wall with her feet. I
told her to stop, which she did for a few seconds, and
then began again. I told her to stop again, and that I
really meant it. The kicking stopped for a longer pe-
riod this time, maybe 30 seconds, and then started
up again. Just then the Whittier–Narrows earth-
quake hit, 5.9 on the Richter scale. Our 50-year-old
house started shaking like crazy. As I was running
into the next room to get my daughter, I ran into
her running into the kitchen screaming “I’m sorry,
Daddy, I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to do it!” Which
brings me to my first point: causal inference can be
tricky.
Causal inference can be tricky not just for small
children, but for epidemiologists and biostatisticians,
too. As an example, consider hormone-replacement
therapy for postmenopausal women. Dozens of ob-
servational studies (including case-control studies and
cohort studies) had suggested a 40–50% reduction
in coronary heart disease (Stampfer and Colditz,
1991). However, the recently reported results of the
Women’s Health Initiative trial demonstrated that
the treatment had an elevated incidence of coronary
heart disease (Manson et al., 2003). Now the statis-
ticians who worked on these epidemiologic studies
thought they were making a valid causal inference.
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In fact, many women took estrogen replacement ther-
apy partly because they believed that it would offer
cardiovascular benefits. However, as the large ran-
domized trial demonstrated, this causal inference
from the observational data was completely wrong.
Because of the difficulty of doing randomized clin-
ical trials of certain interventions, and the public
health importance of whether these interventions
work, I have put the ability to perform causal in-
ference on epidemiologic data on the top of my per-
sonal list of “practical importance” of causal infer-
ence methods (Figure 1). The hormone-replacement
therapy example is, of course, not the only example
of medical studies where incorrect causal inferences
were made. Let me just mention one other: There
were many observational studies that suggested beta
carotene would reduce lung cancer incidence; see In-
ternational Agency for Research on Cancer (1998,
pages 64–103) for a summary. However, randomized
trials of beta carotene supplements showed that it
actually increased the risk of lung cancer. In fact,
the epidemiologic data were so strong that when the
results of the first trial came out (Alpha-Tocopherol
Beta Carotene Cancer Prevention Study Group,
1994), an editorial suggested the possibility that trial
results might be due to an “extreme play of chance”
(Hennekens, Buring and Peto, 1994). However, af-
ter the results of the second trial also showed beta
carotene was causing an increase in lung cancer
(Omenn et al., 1996), it became clear that the epi-
demiologic studies had been wrong. To the extent
that Dr. Rubin’s work can lead to better causal in-
ferences with epidemiologic data of these sorts, it
would be of tremendous practical importance.
A cynical colleague of mine suggested that one
should not give a discussion like this without men-
tioning some of your own work. So as an aside, I
want to briefly mention a causal analysis I did a few
years ago. We were interested in estimating the ef-
fect of an orthodontic treatment from observational
data (Figure 2). These data were from the Univer-
sity of the Pacific orthodontic clinic, so which or-
thodontist saw which patients could be assumed to
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Fig. 1. Practical importance of causal inference issues in
the medical area ( personal view).
be random. What was definitely not random was
which patients received the extraction treatment and
which received the nonextraction treatment, because
this decision depends on the patient characteristics.
Because the treatment decision is not random, one
cannot just compare the outcomes for patients who
received extraction with those who did not. Instead,
we asked each orthodontist to evaluate the other or-
thodontist’s patients and to state which treatment
he would have used for that patient. (These eval-
uations were based only on pretreatment patient
records.) The stated orthodontist preferences enabled
us to stratify the patient population based on or-
thodontist preferences, and perform an analysis re-
stricted to the patient subsets where the orthodon-
tists disagreed (strata 2 and 3 in Figure 3). This
yielded an appropriate causal inference (Korn, Teeter
and Baumrind, 2001). The strata here are similar to
Dr. Rubin’s principal strata, although we were in a
simpler situation because we did not have to esti-
mate which individuals were in which strata using
latent variables, but could just observe them. There-
fore, we did not have to make the distributional as-
sumptions that seem to be required by Dr. Rubin to
make sharp causal inferences.
Returning to our main discussion and moving down
the scale of practical importance, we have noncom-
pliance in randomized clinical trials (Figure 1): As-
sume that you are doing a randomized trial of a new
agent for cancer versus a standard treatment. Now,
not all the patients randomized to the new agent
may actually take it—some may not take it because
they are too sick, some may not take it because they
are having bad side effects, and there could be other
reasons. An analysis of effectiveness analyzes the re-
sults of all the patients, based on the treatment arms
they were randomized to. This is sometimes called
an “intent-to-treat” analysis. A causal-type analysis
might be interested in what is sometimes called effi-
cacy, the treatment difference that would have been
observed if there had been no noncompliance.
The usual arguments for using effectiveness are it
is straightforward to estimate with no assumptions,
and it estimates in the real world how well the treat-
ment is going to work. The usual arguments for us-
ing efficacy are that it estimates the biological effect
of treatment better than effectiveness, and it may
estimate future effectiveness better than current ef-
fectiveness does. This last argument is that if trials
show that a new treatment works, then in the future
patients may be more compliant with that treat-
ment. This argument, however, leads to a potential
issue with Dr. Rubin’s methods. His method seems
to be estimating the treatment effect only on the
subset of patients who would comply given either
treatment in this trial—not in some future setting
where the results of this trial are known. Therefore,
Fig. 2. Observational orthodontic data.
Fig. 3. Observational orthodontic data showing stratifica-
tion by orthodontist preferences (arrows designate strata used
for causal analysis).
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one of the usual reasons for being interested in ef-
ficacy and not effectiveness seems to be negated by
the proposed analysis.
Moving down the scale of practical importance, we
come to endpoint truncation (Figure 1). (I should
note that words like “truncation” and “censoring”
have technical meanings to biostatisticians, and I am
not using the word “truncation” here in its techni-
cal sense. Instead, I am using it to designate what
Dr. Rubin was referring to in his quality-of-life ex-
ample.) Imagine we are conducting a randomized
trial for treating lung cancer, and the outcome is
patient-assessed quality of life at 12 months after
randomization. Some patients are unfortunately go-
ing to die of lung cancer before reaching 12 months,
so how does one account in the analysis for a pa-
tient who dies at 6 months? You could omit the
patient from the analysis, but this leads to obvious
bias. You could try to estimate what the patient’s
quality of life would have been at 12 months if he
had not died. But this sounds pretty meaningless,
almost supernatural. You could restrict the infer-
ence to the subset of patients who would be alive at
12 months regardless of which treatment they were
given. This is Dr. Rubin’s approach. Finally, you
could assign the patient a quality-of-life score consis-
tent with being dead. For example, if you were doing
a rank-sum test comparing the 12-month quality-of-
life scores between the treatment arms, you could
give individuals who died before 12 months the low-
est possible score, such as 0. As mentioned by Dr.
Rubin, there are scaling issues here, but there are
always scaling issues with quality-of-life data, with
many being more difficult than this. Because I like
this last approach (of assigning a low score to indi-
viduals who have died), which does not involve any
causal issues, I have put endpoint truncation low
on my list of causal issues of practical importance
(Figure 1).
There is another kind of endpoint truncation where
a causal method might be of more practical im-
portance. Suppose you are conducting a random-
ized trial of various types of local radiation for head
and neck cancer. (Local radiation means radiation
just at the tumor site.) As a secondary analysis, one
might be interested in how the different types of ra-
diation affect local control of the tumor. One might
use a survival analysis with the endpoint being the
amount of time from randomization to local recur-
rence of the tumor. In this type of survival analy-
sis, there are standard ways to handle (i) individ-
uals who die from causes unrelated to their cancer
and (ii) individuals who are alive with no evidence
of cancer when the analysis is performed. What is
more difficult is how to accommodate individuals
who have a metastatic development of their cancer,
and possibly die, without ever having a local recur-
rence. This is known as a competing risks problem. I
thought about how I would apply Dr. Rubin’s meth-
ods to this problem. As a first pass, it seems like
one would conceptually restrict attention to patients
who would have a local recurrence if they were given
either randomized treatment, but since there is time
involved, it was not obvious how to think about it.
Perhaps Dr. Rubin has explored this in some of his
other papers.
In summary, I think Dr. Rubin’s methods may be
very important for interpreting epidemiologic data.
I would like to see him take some of the old epidemi-
ologic studies that we now know came to wrong con-
clusions, apply his methods, and show his methods
lead to the right conclusions. That would be impres-
sive.
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